Politics and Economics in the Eighties by Charles H. Stewart III
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Politics and Economics in the Eighties
Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-01280-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ales91-1
Conference Date: May 14-15, 1990
Publication Date: January 1991
Chapter Title: The Politics of Tax Reform in the 1980s
Chapter Author: Charles H. Stewart III
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5417
Chapter pages in book: (p. 143 - 174)5  The Politics of  Tax Reform in 
the 1980s 
Charles H. Stewart I11 
The 1980s proved to be one of  the most volatile decades in American tax- 
reform  history.  In  a  policy  area  normally  characterized  by  incremental 
change, the eighties witnessed two major reform efforts along with a host of 
lesser, yet significant adjustments. Income tax rates were slashed in  1981, 
resulting in the only drop in real federal tax receipts since the Great Depres- 
sion that was not associated with war demobilization.’  The tax code was again 
comprehensively rewritten in  1986. Payroll taxes undertook a steady upward 
march, bolstered by the 1983 Social Security “rescue package.” By the end of 
the decade, revenues from Social Security taxes had not only risen well be- 
yond those generated by corporate profits taxes, but they were beginning to 
challenge the income tax for preeminence among federal revenue sources. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political and institutional foun- 
dations of this remarkable stream of events. Two general points will guide this 
examination. First, although the eighties coincided with exceptional volatility 
in the tax code, much of the debate was structured by  the historic divisions 
that have separated the two major political parties. Taxation has usually been 
at the heart of partisan cleavages in the United States. Since at least the New 
Deal, Democrats and Republicans have differed over the progressivity of the 
tax code and the allocation of revenues between personal income and corpo- 
rate profit  taxes.  The  1980 election set the  stage for the  imposition of  a 
Republican-inspired tax policy in 198  1. Democratic resurgence in Congress 
during the rest of  the decade did nothing to alleviate the stalemate over the 
aggregate size of revenues. 
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The second organizing point  of  this paper is that this perennial partisan 
battle over the form of taxation in the United States was guided in the 1980s 
by  crucial institutional and political changes that had  their impetus in the 
1970s. In  the United  States, changes in  policy  outcomes can come about 
either because of  changes in voter preferences (see Page 1987; Shapiro and 
Page 1988) or because of  changes in the political institutions that aggregate 
these preferences.2 In the years preceding the 1980 election there was an insti- 
tutional revolution in the apparatus of making tax policy at the federal level. 
A series of institutional reforms “democratized” proceedings in the U.S. Con- 
gress, making that body more amenable to innovation in tax laws in the early 
1980s. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides a 
brief historical overview of  changes in federal tax policy during the 1980s. 
Section 5.2 discusses changes in public perceptions about taxation and the 
responses of the two major political parties to these changes. Section 5.3 ex- 
amines how two important institutional features of federal policy-making, the 
House Ways  and Means Committee and the constitutional system of checks 
and balances, influenced the shape of tax policy during the decade. Section 
5.4 contains the conclusion. 
5.1  Tax Reform in the 1980s: An Overview3 
The election of 1980 set the stage for the most comprehensive change in the 
tax  code in a generation. Ronald Reagan,  aided by  a working majority  in 
Congress, managed to push through Congress the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act (ERTA) of 1981. The scope of these changes was dramatic. Among the 
most important elements of  ERTA were the following: personal income tax 
rates were cut, with a further cut in capital gains taxes; tax “bracket creep” 
was  halted by  tying  the brackets to changes in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI); businesses and individuals were allowed to accelerate capital deprecia- 
tion; businesses were allowed to “lease” tax credits to other businesses; and 
estate taxes were lowered. Taken together, these changes have been estimated 
by  the Office of  Management and Budget  (OMB) to have lost about $750 
billion to the Treasury between fiscal years 1981 and 1986. 
Concern over a reduction in revenues brought on by a deterioration of the 
economy and the effects of the 1981 tax cuts led Congress in 1982 to consider 
and pass the largest tax increase to date in peacetime history. Leadership in 
support of a tax increase came from within Congress, particularly the Senate 
Finance Committee, which was the focus of  negotiations between Congress 
and the Reagan administration. The resulting Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon- 
sibility Act (TEFRA) promised to raise about $90 billion in new revenues over 
a three-year peri~d.~ 
TEFRA rolled back some of the accelerated depreciation provisions of the 
ERTA and other corporate tax benefits; restricted and phased out the use of 145  The Politics of  Tax Reform 
“safe harbor” leasing arrangements; required federal employees to pay Fed- 
eral Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax for Medicare coverage; instituted 
a more comprehensive “minimum tax” for wealthy individuals; instituted a 
series of measures to improve compliance with federal tax laws, including the 
ill-fated attempt to institute withholding for interest and dividend payments; 
raised taxes to augment the airport trust fund; and raised excise taxes on tele- 
phone calls and cigarettes. Most of the revenues gained through this law came 
in the increase in business taxes, which recovered about one-third of the rev- 
enues lost in the previous year’s tax cuts. 
The most astonishing and puzzling reform of this decade was the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act (TRA). The TRA was exceptional in the degree to which it fol- 
lowed many of the prescriptions that academic economists had been advocat- 
ing for decades, resulting in a broadening of the tax base. The net effect of the 
TRA was also to add some progressivity back into the personal income tax 
system that had been lost in  1981, even though the 1986 reform had  many 
elements of a “flat tax” (see table 5.1). Individual income tax rates were low- 
ered, more low-income individuals were taken off  the rolls, and the number 
of brackets was reduced from 14 to four. 
To  make up for the loss of  revenues from these changes, corporate taxes 
were increased, the minimum tax was raised, the capital gains special exclu- 
sion was repealed, interest deductions for consumer purchases were phased 
out, the investment tax credit was repealed, and deductions for business ex- 
penses and Individual Retirement Account (IRA) contributions were tight- 
ened (see table 5.2). The scope of the changes represented by the TRA was so 
sweeping and  contrary to expectations about the American policy-making 
process that experts and observers still remain puzzled in trying to explain its 
pas~age.~ 
Controversy remains over the degree to which the 1986 act accomplished 
the announced goal of “revenue neutrality.” Congressional analyses accompa- 
Table 5.1  Estimated Percentage Change in Tax Liability for Income Classes due 
to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Estimates made at the time of passage) 
Income class (1986 dollars)  1987  1988 








Greater than $200,000 
-57.2 
-  16.7 
-  10.8 
-  9.4 
-9.8 




-  65.1 





-  1.2 
-2.2 
-  2.4 
~ 
Source: U.S.  Congress, Joint Tax Committee. 1987. General explanation of the Tax Reform Acr 
of1986.  Committee Print, 100th Cong., 1st sess., p. 17, table 1-2. 146  Charles H. Stewart 111 
Table 5.2  Summary of Estimated Budget Effects of the 1988 Tax Reform Act, 
FY 1987-91  (in billions of dollars). 
Tax Year 
Provisions  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1987-91 
Individual  -14.0  -41.0  -37.9  -15.6  -13.5  -121.9 
Corporate  25.3  23.9  22.5  23.4  25.2  120.3 
Excise  .3  .4  .3  .2  .2  1.5 
Gift and estate  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Customs  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Totals  11.5  -16.7  -15.1  8.0  12.0  -  .3 
Employment  .1  ...  ...  ...  ...  -.I 
Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Tax Committee. 1987. General explanation of the Tar Reform Acr 
of 1986. Committee print, 100th Cong.,  1st sess.,  p. 1358, table A-1. 
Nore: Ellipses indicate amounts of less than $50 million. Details may  not sum to totals because 
of rounding. 
nying the passage of the bill reported no net change in revenues through the 
first five years of its implementation. It was assumed that revenues would be 
lost on net during its first three years (fiscal years 1987-89), but that these lost 
revenues would effectively be made up by  fiscal year 1991 (see table 5.2). 
However, OMB estimates of  the reform’s effects are quite different (tables 5.2 
and  5.3).  According to the OMB, the tax reform act ended up  being the 
second-largest tax cut of the decade. Data now becoming available also sug- 
gest that initial assumptions overestimated the net increase in business taxes, 
but underestimated the net cut in individual income taxes (New York Times,  3 
March 1990, Al). 
A change in the tax law that is frequently overlooked is one that concerned 
Social Security. In response to the recommendations of the National Commis- 
sion on Social Security Reform, Congress passed fundamental changes to the 
program in 1983, including a provision to bring new federal workers under 
the system and  to raise payroll taxes. Indeed, changes associated with the 
1983 Social Security Act amendments represented by far the largest net tax 
increase of the decade, in terms of total revenues, once they were fully imple- 
mented: these modifications called for almost $100 billion to be raised in fis- 
cal year 1990, compared to the $57 billion attributable to the effects of  the 
1982 TEFRA (table 5.3). 
In addition to these major laws that had a substantial and long-term impact 
on federal revenues, about a dozen others were passed during the decade that 
changed the structure of  the federal tax system. Probably most interesting 
among these changes was a marked increase in the number of dedicated trust 
funds in the budget and the total amount of money reflected in them. In fiscal 
year (FY) 1979, trust funds accounted for 41% of  federal revenues, but by 
1988 this had grown to 52%. The growth of trust funds in part reflected the Table 5.3  Changes in Budget Receipts, FY  1982-1990. 
~~  ~  ~  ~~~~ 
Year  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Receipts under tax laws in  650.8  656.0  749.4  821.3  822.5  873.9  1,002.6  1,088.2  1,167.3 
Administrative action  .2  .2  .o  .2  .2  1  .o  .8  .8  .6 
effect January 1991 
Legislative changes: 
ERTA 1981  -35.6  -82.6  - 
TERFA 1982  17.3 
TRA 1986 
Changes in Social Security  1.9  5.3 
Other laws passed: 







Other  .5  -  .4 
Total recepits  617.8  587.5 






-  .4 
666.4 








-170.3  -207.5  - 
39.2  49.2 
30.5  39.7 
4.2  4.5 
-  1.7  -  1.0 
9.3  16.0 
.I  0.6 
734.0  776.4 
264.4 
57.3 
-  8.9 
70.3 
4.9 








-  290.9 
55.7 
-  24.4 
85.2 
5.1 








-  322.8 
57.2 











Source: U.S. President, 1982-90.  These are estimates provided in the annual budget documents, therefore they are subject to frequent revision. 
Therefore, these figures should be taken to represent ballpark figures, rather than hard-and-fast estimates. 
Note: The first row of figures is an estimate of the amount of revenue that would have been generated in each fiscal year if no changes to tax law had 
been made in the 1980s. Other rows gives estimates of the revenue gains or losses for that fiscal year attributable to the relevant change in tax law. 
For instance, if there had been no changes to federal tax law during the decade, then the federal government is estimatjed to have received $1,167.3 
billion in revenues during FY 1990. The net effect of the 1981 ERTA is estimated to be a loss of  revenues during FY  1990 to the order of $322.8 
billion. The net effects of changes to the  1981 ERTA itself are reflected in the estimates for the relevant subsequent tax laws; e.g., the effects of 
rolling back the accelerated depreciation provisions of the ERTA that occurred in 1982 are reflected in figures for TEFRA. 148  Charles H.  Stewart I11 
rise in  Social Security contributions mandated in  1983 and before, but not 
entirely: The share of non-Social Security trust-fund receipts rose from 19% 
to 24%  of all federal revenues between FY 1979 and FY 1988. 
The growth in the importance of dedicated revenues and trust funds within 
the federal budget reflected at least two strategies that became increasingly 
popular as the decade progressed. One was the popularity of  pay-as-you-go 
schemes: by limiting expenditures in these programs to current revenues plus 
accumulated surpluses, national politicians could claim they were enacting 
popular programs without adding to the size of the deficit. Second, trust funds 
were popular among program supporters because having a dedicated income 
stream was believed to protect programs from future spending cuts. 
Throughout the decade, outlays for programs tied to trust funds rarely ap- 
proached income to the funds. At the end of  FY  1979 the OMB reported 
combined trust fund balances of $183.6 billion. By the end of FY 1988 these 
balances had grown to $548.4 billion, a nominal increase of 200% and a real 
increase of 83%. This gradual accretion of trust fund surpluses served to blunt 
the deficits occurring in the “federal funds” portion of  the budget. In  1988, 
for instance, trust funds reduced the size of the federal deficits by about 39%.6 
Because trust fund  surpluses are invested in  U.S. Treasury  securities, the 
practical effect was to make more revenues available for the federal funds 
portion of the budget.’ Because interest is then paid from the Treasury to the 
trust funds, the net effect is also to provide some general fund revenue for 
trust fund programs such as Social Security.* 
Few would dispute the degree to which tax laws are different in 1990 com- 
pared  to  1980  or  the  level  of  upheaval  that  accompanied most  of  these 
changes. According to one estimate of the effects of the various tax laws dur- 
ing the decade, in fiscal year 1990 the federal government will collect approx- 
imately  $100 billion less  in  revenues than  it would  have  collected if  no 
changes had been made to the tax code during the 1980s (table 5.3). The 1981 
cuts accounted for over 90% of revenues lost during the decade-a  total of 
$323 billion in FY 1990 alone-while  laws passed after 1981 amounted to a 
net increase in revenues of over $200 billion in FY 1990. 
Leaving aside net aggregate changes in revenue levels, changes early in the 
decade shifted revenues away  from corporations  and  toward  personal in- 
comes, especially wages (fig. 5.1). Later reforms restored the relative stand- 
ing of corporate taxes, but did not end the shift in the individual tax burden 
from a broad-based income tax toward a narrower tax on wages, reflected in 
rising Social Security contributions. 
Another important change in the tax code was its attention to investment, 
saving, and capital formation. Both parties went into 1980 dedicated to ad- 
dressing the prevailing “stagflation” with a host of proposed revisions to the 
income tax code. Indeed, the name of  the tax change that finally passed in 
1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act, illustrates the legacy of this concern. 
Every major provision that was placed in the act was justified as a method of 149  The Politics of Tax Reform 
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Fig. 5.1  Percentage composition of federal receipts by sources, FY  1970-95 
(figures for FY  1990-95  are estimates) 
Source: U.S. President, 1991, A-286. 
stimulating economic vitality. Yet,  one is struck at the rapidity with which 
many of these provisions were rescinded or scaled back-some  in the interest 
of recovering lost revenues (as with TEFRA in 1982) and some in the interest 
of  lowering marginal rates (in 1986). In fact, one close observer of the 1986 
reform battle noted that “the architecture of the Senate committee bill makes 
the capital gains increase a load-bearing wall” for the distribution of  the re- 
sulting tax cut among income groups (Shanahan 1986a). 
Because net spending cuts were never enacted during the decade nearly to 
the degree of  the net tax cuts (especially the  1981 tax cuts), the persistent 
problem of the federal deficit is closely related to taxation politics during the 
decade (see McCubbins, in this volume). Indeed, tax increases in 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987, and 1988 (amounting to about $50 billion in new revenues by FY 
1990) were a direct consequence of grappling with the budget, either within 
the formal reconciliation process under the Budget Act or under less formal 
negotiations between congressional leaders and the administration. 
Having sketched out the contours of changes in tax policy during the 1980s, 
I will use the next two sections to explore shifts in attitudes and institutions 
that gave rise to the rocky road down which tax policy traveled in the 1980s. 
5.2  Change and Continuity in ’IBx Preferences 
Practically no one enjoys paying taxes. Yet  most accept the inevitability of 
taxes along with life’s other “givens.” While taxes are inevitable, the contours 150  Charles H. Stewart I11 
of  taxation-amount,  type, and  incidence-are  not. Quite naturally, these 
basic questions about tax policy have animated much political debate through- 
out American history. The political parties in part owe their identities to their 
respective answer to the “tax question.” And, it is their desire to win elections 
that keeps them attuned to changes in public attitudes about taxes. 
In trying to understand tax policy during the 1980s it is instructive at the 
outset to look to preferences-first,  those expressed by  the general public 
and, second, those articulated by the parties. To some degree changes in tax 
policy in the 1980s can be attributed to changes in preferences expressed by 
the public and the parties. In large measure, however, expressed preferences 
remained remarkably stable, a fact that will lead us in the following section to 
analyze the institutions that translated preferences into policy. 
5.2.1  Taxes and Public Opinion 
In considering changes in tax law during the 1980%  it is important to back 
up and  consider changes in taxation politics during the preceding decade. 
While one thing was constant-all  groups and individuals in society contin- 
ued to prefer to pay lower taxes to higher-two  important developments oc- 
curred in the seventies that influenced tax debate in the eighties: (1) a nation- 
wide, grass-roots “tax-revolt” that began in the states and (2) a shift in the 
debate about the consequences of tax reform toward an emphasis on the mi- 
croeconomics of taxation. 
What has been termed the tax revolt of the seventies began primarily as a 
state-level phenomenon best symbolized by the passage of Proposition 13 in 
California in 1978. The genesis of this movement is still subject to debate, but 
citizens’ support for the measures advocated by tax warriors was associated 
with feelings that government had grown rapacious, inefficient, and bloated. 
Ironically, these attitudes infrequently coincided with a rejection of activist 
government. Indeed, few supporters of measures such as Proposition 13 be- 
lieved that restrictions on state and local tax revenues would require service 
cuts. In the words of Sears and Citrin (1982), supporters of tax-cutting mea- 
sures at the state level appeared to want something for nothing: because gov- 
ernment was so full of waste, fraud, and abuse, it was commonly assumed 
that cutting revenues would simply cause state governments to cut waste, al- 
lowing existing services to continue at preexisting levels  .9 
If  dissatisfaction with state-level revenue policies animated much of  local 
politics in the middle 1970s, it was a matter of time before the electoral con- 
nection would manifest that dissatisfaction at the federal level. As citizens 
were reining in states’ abilities to levy taxes, they were also changing their 
overall evaluation of the equity of the federal system of taxation: throughout 
the decade, the federal income tax was perceived to be the least fair of  all 
taxes (fig. 5.2). It is not surprising, therefore, that members of Congress 
(MCs) agitated more vigorously for reform of  the federal tax code as the 151  The Politics of Tax Reform 
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Fig. 5.2  Which do you think is the worst tax-that  is, the least fair? (only 
responses naming the federal income tax and local property tax are graphed) 
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1988 
1980s began, and that proposals to cut taxes and amend the Constitution to 
limit the federal government’s tax powers became popular.  lo 
Whether this revolt had any lasting effect on the federal level beyond sup- 
port expressed for the 1981 tax cuts is unclear. Once rates were cut in  1981, 
the number of citizens who believed federal tax rates were too high dropped 
and the number who favored an increase in tax rates rose, especially if  the 
purpose of  the proposed  tax  increase was  to expand popular federal pro- 
grams.”  (Still, surveys by  the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations [  19881 suggest the most popular revenue-raising proposal by far is 
a national lottery.) The sense that the political rage over the tax issue had been 
sufficiently vented  is  attested  to  in  the  gradual undoing of  the tax  conse- 
quences of  1981 and the almost unheard of passage of tax increases in four 
successive election years. 
The second interesting political change during the 1970s that influenced tax 
debate in the eighties was a subtle shift in the elite debate about federal taxes 
that deemphasized macroeconomic policy stability and emphasized micro- 
economic efficiency. The specific economic ills that were addressed in this 
debate were diverse, but the most important were the stagflation of the 1970s 
and the United States’ increasing lack of competitiveness in global markets. 
The movement that fostered the debate was most clearly associated with the 
“supply-side” economics school, which argued that the existing tax system 
provided disincentives for work, discouraged entrepreneurship and innova- 152  Charles H. Stewart 111 
tion, discouraged capital formation, and channeled scarce resources into un- 
productive sectors of the economy.’* 
The arguments advanced by supply-side economists in the 1970s supplied 
a political agenda for the Reagan tax changes in 1981  .I3 Many if not most of 
the reforms advocated by  supply-siders were adopted by Congress in  1981, 
including a reduction in the top marginal rate, accelerated depreciation, and 
provisions to encourage saving. 
Related to this debate about the structure of  the federal tax system was a 
new willingness to use the tax code to achieve certain social ends. While the 
use of tax preferences to achieve social and economic ends has always been a 
part of  the tax code, conservatives (and a few liberals) began to see the tax 
code as the optimal way to achieve social goals in comparison to bureaucrati- 
cally managed social programs. This analysis was a direct consequence of the 
work of Niskanen (1970) and others, who noted that bureaus were inherently 
inefficient  in  achieving  social  purposes.  By  providing  benefits  directly 
through the tax code (e.g., providing tax incentives to build low-cost housing 
instead of having the federal government build housing projects) social ends 
could be achieved virtually automatically, without bureaucratic inefficiencies. 
In a time of general disenchantment with bureaucratic government, these 
types of  arguments even became attractive to many liberals. Further, faced 
with fiscal constraints, tinkering with the tax code provided an attractive ave- 
nue to continue social programs at a lower level of visibility. The result was a 
proliferation of tax preferences designed to achieve specific social purposes. 
While this practice of  accelerated “tax expenditures” began in  the middle- 
1970s-the  Carter energy program virtually floated in tax incentives-their 
use ballooned beginning in 1981 and continued strong until the 1986 tax re- 
form eliminated many tax preferences (see table 5.4).  l4 
One consequence of this proliferation of tax expenditures, in addition to the 
narrow economic benefits that were conveyed on segments of society, was the 
growing complexity of the tax code. The complexity of the individual income 
tax brought on a gradual rise during the 1980s of the percentage of tax returns 
filed using the 1040 form, rather than the IRS’s shorter 1040A or 1040EZ.15 
This complexity, brought on by the proliferation of special income tax pro- 
visions, was one of the most important motivations behind tax reform in 1985 
and  1986. The magnitude of  tax expenditures appears to have been signifi- 
cantly reduced (table 5.4), although the length of the IRS forms most individ- 
uals must fill out has remained unchanged or has even lengthened. 
All would probably agree that a positive outcome of the heightened salience 
of the issues raised by tax reform has been a greater widespread appreciation 
of  how economic actors respond strategically to provisions of  the tax code. 
An  important negative consequence has been the progressive complexity of 
the tax code, which makes taxpayers even more skeptical of the federal gov- 
ernment’s ability to govern and less confident that future changes to the tax 
code will indeed achieve the results foreseen by reformers.I6 153  The Politics of Tax Reform 
Table 5.4  Federal Tax Expenditures  in Selected Outlay Functions, FY  1975-89, 
(In billions of 1989 dollars) 
Fiscal Year 
Function  1975  1979  1985  1989 
Energy 
Natural resources and environment 
Commerce and housing credit 
Education, training, employment, and 
Health 
Income security (including Social 
Security) 
Total tax expenditures 
Dollars 
Percent of outlays 
social services 

































5.2.2  The Parties Respond 
From the beginning of the Republic, tax policy has been at the root of par- 
tisan divisions in the United States, and tax preferences ultimately reflect the 
constituency bases of the two parties. Jeffersonianism arose, in part, in reac- 
tion to Hamiltonian (i.e., Federalist) tariff policies.’’ Almost from the creation 
of the Republican Party in the 185Os, Democrats and Republicans have fought 
fiercely over tax policy: first, they fought over the level of  the tariff, with 
Republicans defending protection and Democrats favoring “a tariff  for reve- 
nue only” and an income tax. Since the permanent institution of the income 
tax in  the 191Os, the two parties have  fought over its salient features, with 
Democrats favoring more progressive rates and a greater reliance on taxing 
corporate profits and Republicans opposing both policies. 
On the whole, the public appeals made by  the two parties in  the  1980s 
evoked each party’s respective heritage, although this does not mean that they 
did not respond to the transformation of the taxation issue begun in the 1970s. 
In line with the past, the  1980 Democratic party platform emphasized the 
equity of the tax system, highlighting changes in the tax code to help lower- 
and middle-class taxpayers. The Republican platform emphasized a tax cut in 
general, with a reduction in the top rates in particular to encourage “produc- 
tivity and saving.” The 1984 Democratic platform decried the “combination 
of  loopholes for the few and high rates for the many” instituted during the 
preceding  four  years,  while  the  Republicans promised  to  “eliminate the 
incentive-destroying  effects of graduated tax rates” that had been foisted upon 
the country by  a string of  Democratic administrations. In general, when it 
came to working on particular changes in the tax code, Democrats in  the 154  Charles H. Stewart 111 
1980s attempted to protect progressivity while efforts to reduce business taxes 
and to lower capital gains and other taxes paid disproportionately by  wealthy 
individuals were generally led by Republicans in Congress and in the White 
House. 
Arguing that partisanship pervaded the process and defined the major divi- 
sions of the tax-reform debate does not mean that these cleavages were always 
clear. As mentioned in the previous section, Democrats proved to be as adept 
as Republicans in offering concessions to businesses and high-income taxpay- 
ers when bargaining over the 1981 tax cut became most intense. And divisions 
within the Democratic party became evident in 1981 and during the 1989 ef- 
fort to cut capital gains taxes.  In  these cases,  Republican  administrations 
could exploit divisions within the Democratic party to promote the passage of 
Republican tax policy. Still, strategic attempts to court pivotal voters, in the 
electorate and in Congress, should not be confused with fundamental changes 
in the parties’ cores as embodied in platforms and expressed by activists. 
Details of the tax debate in the 1970s and into the early 1980s can be under- 
stood from the perspective of  the parties trying to forge winning electoral 
coalitions around an increasingly salient issue. Although it did not require the 
Republican party to give up long-held beliefs, it can be argued that the Repub- 
lican resurgence after the debacle of  1974 came through their identification of 
taxation as an issue bound to attract votes. Ronald Reagan’s own message 
particularly embraced the politics of the tax warriors of his own state and set 
the agenda for the early years of his administration.I8 
The Democratic response to the heightened salience of  taxation was more 
tortured. The problem for the Democrats was especially focused in 1981: reel- 
ing in the wake of the 1980 election, when the Senate had unexpectedly gone 
Republican, House Democrats could only wonder whether 1982 would be a 
repeat of  1980 (or even of  1934, the last time the party controlling the presi- 
dency gained seats in the House during an off-year election). Southern Dem- 
ocrats were especially in a tight spot, since the 1980 election represented the 
greatest strength of the Republican party in the South since Reconstruction. 
Southern Democrats had lost 8 of  their 77 seats in the House in the  1980 
election, along with 4 of  their 16 Senate seats. Of  the Southern Democrats 
who remained in the House, Ronald Reagan was proficient in winning votes 
in their districts: Reagan carried 58% of the southern districts that sent a Dem- 
ocrat to the House in 1980 (Almanac of American Politics 1982).19 
The result of the South’s electoral uncertainty in 1981 was to induce support 
among most Southern Democrats for ERTA. On the four substantive roll call 
votes on the 1981 tax cut, Southern Democrats supported the cut by  margins 
of 71%, 54%, 88%, and 96%, respectively (Congressional Quarterly Alma- 
nac  1981).20  Northern Democrats opposed these votes by  margins of  72%, 
93%, 60%, and 65%, while Republican support only once dropped below 
99% support, when they opposed the Udall substitute with a 97% margin.21 
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Southern Democrats returned to the fold, and, until the aborted effort to cut 
capital gains taxes  in  1989, Southern and  Northern Democrats generally 
joined forces to oppose Republicans on tax votes in both the House and Sen- 
ate. For instance, the roll call votes in the House of the 1982 TEFRA found, 
on average, 73% of the Northern Democrats and 74% of the Southern Demo- 
crats voting against 42% of the Republicans (Congressional Quarterly Alma- 
nac, 1982). 
Therefore, the rising salience of taxation and the parties’ response had two 
major influences on tax reform in the 1980s. First, taxation was an issue on 
which Ronald Reagan claimed his mandate in  1980 and on which Southern 
Democrats tried to secure their electoral positions in 198  1. The confluence of 
these two events opened the door for an overall decrease in revenues and a 
dramatic reduction in  corporate taxation in  1981. Second, results from the 
1982 and subsequent congressional elections made it clear that Ronald Rea- 
gan did not have extraordinary electoral appeal and that the “partisan realign- 
ment” some political scientists and commentators  were anticipating would not 
be forthcoming. The Democrats became more unified, and Republicans them- 
selves were more frequently on the defensive with the electorate in fiscal mat- 
ters. Thus, improved Democratic fortunes in Congress for the rest of the dec- 
ade helped restore corporate taxes and some of the progressivity that was lost 
in 1981. 
5.3  Institutions and Tax Policy 
While preferences may be  the ultimate source of policy in  a democracy, 
there is  a plethora of different institutions through which those preferences 
may be channeled into policy outcomes. In this section I focus on two insti- 
tutional systems-one  small, the other great-and  their influence on tax pol- 
icy during the 1980s. The first is the committee system in the House of Rep- 
resentatives and the second is the system of  divided powers defined by  the 
Constitution. 
5.3.1 
Much has been written about the institutional reforms that gripped Con- 
gress in the 1960s and 1970s. The end result of these reforms was to distribute 
political influence more evenly throughout the two chambers, but especially 
in  the House, which was the more rule bound of  the two. More than most 
committees, the House Ways and Means Committee, the key tax committee 
in Congress, was buffeted by several waves of reform.” 
Almost from the beginning of the Republic, the Ways and Means Commit- 
tee had been afforded a special place in the power hierarchy of the House, and 
that power remained virtually undiminished (and frequently expanded) until 
the  1960~.~~  It was  the first substantive standing committee created in  the 
House; it has continued to have sole oversight over tax legislation in the House 
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for two centuries; before the emergence of a formal party leadership system at 
the turn of the twentieth century, its chair was typically regarded as the floor 
leader of the majority party in the House; after 1910 its Democratic members 
became the “committee on committees” for all Democratic committee assign- 
ments; with the rise of  social insurance legislation in the 1930s it acquired 
considerable authority over spending programs such as Social Security and 
Medicare; and its legislation was considered in private sessions, frequently 
coming to the House floor under a “closed rule,” which prohibited amend- 
ments. Combined with the leadership of independent and wily chairs, such as 
Wilbur D. Mills (&Arkansas)  who chaired the committee from 1959 to 1974, 
Ways and Means was usually the authoritative instrument of making tax pol- 
icy in the entire federal government. 
As a practical matter, Ways and Means’ firm grip on tax policy was Janus- 
faced. On the one hand the strict control exercised over tax policy by  Ways 
and  Means and  the  strict screening mechanism  for choosing its  members 
yielded a conservative tax code whose provisions changed slowly and which 
produced revenues sufficient to fund the expenditures granted by its sister con- 
trol committee, Appropriations. On the other hand, iron-clad control meant 
that certain types of  “reforms” were unaddressable, especially those favored 
by  the growing number of  liberal Democratic representatives who entered 
Congress in the 1950s and 1960s. It also meant that the few tax preferences 
that were meted out were provided at the sufferance of the chairman in a way 
the rank and file often thought arbitrary. 
Formal reforms that most affected the Ways and Means Committee during 
the  1960s and  1970s included the following: the committee’s size was in- 
creased by  approximately 50%; the Democratic members of  the committee 
ceased  to  function  as  the  party’s  “committee on  committees”; Ways  and 
Means was required to create subcommittees with staff and agendas controlled 
by the subcommittee, not the committee chair; and the use of the “closed rule” 
was  severely restricted and brought under the oversight of  the Democratic 
caucus.  In  addition,  the chairs of  all House committees became electable 
through  secret Democratic caucus balloting.  And  all committees were  re- 
quired to hold meetings in public unless its members voted in a roll call to 
close  a  particular  meeting.  Finally,  party  leaders began  appointing fewer 
members to the committee who came from safe electoral constituencies and 
placed more electorally “marginal” members on the committee. 
The general impact of  these institutional reforms was to make Ways  and 
Means a more permeable political body and, ultimately, to make tax policy 
more amenable to shifting political winds. 
Events of  1981 were frequently used  as  evidence about  the cumulative 
faults of  the various committee reforms,  especially those that changed the 
authority of Ways and Means. According to the conventional accounts of this 
legislative session, the considered judgment of Ways and Means’ leaders and 
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no institutional position to protect the principle of a coherent tax code against 
the appeals of  vocal (and well-heeled) special interests. In the end, the fren- 
zied bidding between the Reagan administration and House Democratic lead- 
ers, all of whom used tax preferences as currency, was facilitated because the 
institutions of tax control had been gutted. 
So, at best, these earlier reforms facilitated political responsiveness in the 
tax code in the wake of the 1980 election. At worst, these reforms gutted the 
Ways  and Means Committee’s function as a bulwark against lost revenues, 
trendy tax theories, and preferential treatment of prosperous special interests 
through tax breaks. 
The earlier changes in Congress had less dramatic impact on subsequent 
reforms as the decade progressed. Indeed it can be argued that changes to the 
tax code after 1981 came because party and tax committee leaders found ways 
to circumvent the porosity of  the postreform Congress and its tax commit- 
tee~.~~ 
For instance, success in developing TEFRA in 1982 is often attributed to 
Senator Robert Dole’s (R-Kansas,  chair of  the Senate Finance Committee) 
deciding to mark up the legislation in a closed party caucus and then enforcing 
a strict germaneness rule when the bill was considered on the floor. After 
1984, Dan  Rostenkowski (D-Illinois,  chair of  the House Ways  and Means 
Committee) began regularly closing all markup sessions of  his committee. 
And, the 1986 Tax Reform Act may have been saved from becoming yet an- 
other loophole giveaway when the chairs of the Ways and Means and Finance 
Committees intervened at crucial moments to lead closed-door, behind-the- 
scenes  bargaining  (Bimbaum  and  Murray  1987; Conlan,  Wrightson,  and 
Beam 1990). 
Changes made by party leaders in assigning members to Ways and Means 
also point in a more subtle way to the restoration of that committee’s insula- 
tion from short-term electoral forces. The transformation of  the Ways  and 
Means Committee can be dated with the 94th Congress (1975-76),  when the 
committee’s size was expanded from 25 to 37 members. Combined with new 
appointments necessitated by electoral defeat and retirement, most members 
of  Ways  and Means were new to the committee. And, of  these brand new 
committee members, nearly half were serving either in their first or second 
terms in the House (table 5.5). 
Following another large entering class with the  1976 election, only one- 
third of the members of Ways and Means had served on the committee for at 
least two Congresses. Thus, not only was the typical member of  Ways  and 
Means in the late 1970s a neophyte in terms of prior House and committee 
service, but he (or she) was of the “Watergate generation.” Classes elected in 
1974 and 1976 were renowned for being especially adept at keeping close to 
their constituents and using new technologies and techniques to win reelec- 
tion. (A large part of this innovation was out of necessity, since many mem- 
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Table 5.5  Prior Service in House of Representatives, New Appointees to Ways 
and Means Committee, 80th-101st  Congress (1947-91) 
Congresses  Decade  %’  N 
82d-86th  1950s  8  25 
87th-91 st  1960s  20  25 
92d-96th  1970s  51  43 
97th-I 0  1  St  1980s  29  24 
Source: Congressional Directory, various years. 
’%  of  new members of  Committee on Ways and Means serving first or second term in the House 
of  Representatives. 
“Republican” districts, and thus especially vulnerable electorally.) Thus, the 
instincts of many members of Ways and Means were not geared toward resist- 
ing constituent pressure once the 1981 tax wars rolled around. 
For the past three Congresses, however, party leaders have begun again to 
appoint more senior and electorally secure members to Ways and Means (Stra- 
han  1990,  146). While all new members are now of  the post-Watergate era, 
waiting longer before appointing members to Ways and Means led to different 
committee dynamics in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. In particular, the 
views of recent appointees are better known to party leaders making commit- 
tee assignments, which leads to fewer surprises in committee deliberations. In 
addition, senior members tend to be less electorally vulnerable, opening the 
way  for Ways and Means, once again, to resist, rather than to capitulate to, 
shifting policy  sentiments. Indeed,  in his recent comprehensive analysis of 
politics and policy-making in the post-reform Ways and Means Committee, 
Strahan (1990) attributes the success of  the  1986 reform almost entirely to 
efforts by  House Democratic leaders and chairman Rostenkowski to restore 
the tax-making process to something resembling the pre-reform status quo. 
Therefore, as the decade ended it appeared that party and tax committee 
leaders were moving to reduce the visibility of  tax decision making and to 
reduce tax policy porosity. Whether these will represent long-term changes 
will likely be answered as tax policy continues to be debated in the 1990~~~  If 
it does represent a break from the immediate past and a return to the politics 
of the Wilbur Mills era, then the resurgent permeability of  Ways and Means 
will certainly cut two ways. The committee (and ultimately the internal reve- 
nue code) may be more resistant to particular demands for tax relief, but there 
are no  guarantees that  such impermeability will  induce responsiveness  to 
more general demands for tax reform, as was charged against the pre-reform 
Ways and Means Committee. 
5.3.2  The Separation of Powers and Tax Policy 
Another key institution that deserves mention is the division-of-powers sys- 
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mained formally unchanged during the 1980s, but it is also an institution that 
affected the course of tax politics in important ways. 
By separation of powers I am of course refemng to the system by which the 
three  legislative  “branches”-the  Senate,  House,  and  presidency-are 
elected in  separate elections from different constituencies. Majorities in the 
Senate and House, along with the president, must simultaneously concur with 
a piece of legislation before it overturns the status quo to become law. There- 
fore, in considering legislation, majorities in each congressional chamber, in 
addition to the president, hold a veto power over legislative changes. 
Recent work in the public-choice theory of legislatures has been impressed 
by  the veto game created by  the Constitution (see McCubbins 1990, and in 
this volume), but it has also noted that the power to veto legislation is not 
absolute (see Kiewiet and  McCubbins 1991, chap. 9). This is because the 
Constitution also allows Congress to move first (and, in the case of taxation, 
the House to move before the Senate) and thus set the agenda in legislation. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates a very simple example of  how  the “trilateral veto 
power”  might  interact  with  congressional  agenda-setting  power  to  limit 
changes in tax policy. Imagine that the continuum in figure 5.3 delineates the 
mix between income and corporate profits taxes. In the example, the House 
median (H) prefers taxes to be oriented more toward corporate profits, the 
president (P)  prefers more taxes to come from personal incomes, and the Sen- 
ate median (S) prefers some middle course. Let Q indicate the status quo, or 
the current tax mix, which is to the right of the president’s ideal. 
Assuming Euclidean preferences,26  the House median could not craft a tax 
bill that would take tax policy all the way to its ideal point, since the president 
would object to such a bill (although the median senator would concur). But, 
there is a bill, labeled B,  ,  that the president would prefer to Q and which the 
medians in both congressional chambers would also prefer. Thus, the presi- 
dential veto would keep the president from having to endure tax policy located 
at H,  but agenda-setting power such as that granted to the House in the Con- 
stitution allows the House to move policy closer to it, to B, .*’ 
Such “agenda-cum-veto” power was important during the 1980s because, 
during the entire decade, control of the federal government was split between 
the Democrats and Republicans. Thus, tax policy was susceptible to such ve- 
toes. Once the tax code was changed dramatically in 1981 it would be nearly 
impossible to  amend the code to change total revenues dramatically or to 
change significantly the relative standing of each party’s core constituents. 
H  BH  S  P  Q 
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Fig. 5.3  One-dimensional  examples of “trilateral veto game” between the 
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Fig. 5.4  Location of pivotal members of the House and Senate and the 
president in relation to the status quo after the 1980 election 
Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 below use a simple spatial model and one of 
among many plausible depictions of relevant preference to suggest why it was 
possible to overcome the objections of the House majority Democrats in 1981 
and pass an essentially Republican tax reform, and then why stalemate was 
virtually guaranteed afterwards. 
Figure 5.4 presents, in stylized fashion, the location of the relevant actors 
following the 1980 election along two dimensions of tax policy. The first di- 
mension measures the amount of revenue to be generated by  taxing corpora- 
tions and high-income individuals, while the second dimension measures the 
revenues generated by  taxing low- and middle-income individuals. For brev- 
ity I will call these “Republican taxes” and “Democratic taxes,” respectively, 
to indicate whose constituents will pay more taxes. 
The status quo, Q, is the baseline from which the other bliss points are 
located. (The diagonal line represents all points at which tax policy would 
yield revenues identical to Q.) “Pivotal” members of  the House Ways  and 
Means Committee, the House, and the Senate, along with the president, are 
represented as points labeled W; H, S, and P, respectively.**  Each point indi- 
cates that, as we move away from the status quo, a majority in each institution 
preferred more and more tax cuts and they preferred those cuts to be targeted 
more and more toward high incomes and corporations. A  series of  circles 
represents the regions in which the relevant political actor would prefer tax 161  The Politics of  Tax Reform 
policy to be, compared to the status quo. These circles represent each institu- 
tion’s “preferred-to set” against the status quo, indicated by Pi(Q)  for i = H, 
S,  and f?  (To  aid in clarity, the Ways  and Means Committee’s preferred-to 
set is omitted,  but  it would  be  a small circle centered on W and  passing 
through Q.) 
In  order to change tax policy, any credible proposal must lie within the 
intersection of the preferred-to sets of the House, Senate, and president. This 
intersection is termed the “win set” [W(Q)]  and is highlighted with bold lines 
in figure 5.4. 
Note  two  things  about this  diagram.  First,  assuming Ways  and  Means 
would follow the traditional course and report the tax bill to the floor under a 
closed rule,29  it would have reported a bill identical to its own ideal, u! since 
W E  W(Q).  However, the high salience of the issue virtually guaranteed that 
the liberal Democratic majority on Ways and Means would be unable to im- 
pose its will on the House. Thus, in a series of negotiations within the com- 
mittee and with key leaders of House Democrats, Rostenkowski managed to 
get a bill through Ways and Means more like B,-less  progressive than most 
on the committee preferred but still more Democratic in character than that 
preferred by Senate Republicans and the administration. The key to this strat- 
egy, however, was  an up-or-down  vote on the plan,  engineered through  a 
closed rule. 
What the administration and its followers believed, however,  was that a 
majority in the House would support a bill such as B,  (larger overall cuts and 
oriented more toward businesses and high-income individuals) if  the House 
were given the opportunity to vote for it. In fact, supporters of the administra- 
tion  prevailed,  and  the  committee-reported tax  cut  was  effectively paired 
against the Republican substitute, leading to an ultimate victory for the presi- 
dent. 
A bill much like B,  was ultimately sent to Ronald Reagan for his signature. 
It contained a smaller cut than he originally called for in his February 18 tax 
address, and its mix of business and individual tax changes was not his ideal, 
but the outcome was virtually as good as he could do, given preferences in 
Congress. 
Once something like B,  had been installed as the status quo, notice how the 
dynamics of tax reform shifted (fig. 5.5). (Ideal points in figs. 5.4 and 5.5 are 
identical. In  fig. 5.5, Q has been shifted to reflect passage of  B, as the tax 
law.) First, compare the win sets of figures 5.4 and 5.5.  In figure 5.4 this was 
a large region southwest of the old status quo, constrained principally by ma- 
jority preferences in the House. In figure 5.5 (after the tax cut) it has collapsed 
to a barely perceptible lens radiating out from the new status quo to the north- 
east. Substantively this suggests that the range of  bargaining over tax policy 
shrank dramatically after 1981. Second, notice that while there is room to 
negotiate for a tax increase, it is slight. What movement is possible allows for 
slight adjustments upward of Republican and Democratic taxes. 
Figure 5.5 provides some insight into the politics of the 1986 TRA. Mem- 162  Charles H. Stewart I11 
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Fig. 5.5  Location of pivotal members of the House and Senate and the 
president in relation to the new status quo after the 1981 tax cut 
bers in all three legislative institutions had reason to be dissatisfied with tax 
policy and to desire a change. However, the outcome of the 1981 ERTA se- 
verely constrained the range in which they could jointly act to change policy. 
With only a moderate change in preferences among the relevant actors be- 
tween 1981 and 1986 any reform would have to be (nearly) “revenue neutral.” 
Figure 5.6 moves the location of the Senate to equal that of the House, to 
suggest how the election of  1986, which brought the Democrats back into 
control of the Senate, may have changed the interinstitutional dynamics of tax 
policy politics. The figure suggests that the election of  1986 left the underly- 
ing tensions of  making tax policy virtually unchanged-there  is room for a 
slightly larger tax increase than before, but only barely. 
The details of  this example are sensitive to the precise location of  ideal 
points chosen, but any of  the number of plausible representations yield the 
same results: events of  1981 moved tax policy much closer to the Pareto set 
and, as such,  limited severely the ability to alter tax policy in the ensuing 
years. Thus, in the complement to spending politics (see McCubbins 1990, 
and in this volume), the existence of institutional vetoes in setting tax policy 
served to keep total taxes down during the decade, once the 1981 tax cut had 
been passed.  Majorities in the Congress (and their supporters), along with 
members  of  the  administration  (and  their  supporters),  may  be  seriously 
troubled by the current state of tax policy, either because of  its total yield or 163  The Politics of  Tax Reform 
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Fig. 5.6  Location of pivotal members of the House and  Senate and  the 
president in relation to the new status quo after the 1986 election 
its incidence, but, given the separation of powers, there is little they can do 
short of dramatic electoral turnover that yields unified partisan control of the 
entire federal government. 
5.4  Conclusion 
The general thrust of the accounting presented here is simple: tax policy in 
the 1980s was guided by the confluence of changing preferences and institu- 
tions. As the decade began, discontent with taxation had reached a high level, 
and a president was elected promising to cut taxes in a particular way. Uncer- 
tainty among congressional Democrats over the magnitude and significance 
of Reagan’s 1980 electoral victory, along with Republican gains in both the 
Senate and the House, provided an influx of individuals into the federal gov- 
ernment in  1981 intent upon lowering taxes with a supply-side flavor. Re- 
forms in the 1970s designed to make the House Ways and Means Committee 
more responsive to floor majorities also helped the passage of supply-side tax 
reform in the House nominally controlled by the Democrats. 
After 1981 the story was completely different. While the 1981 tax cut was 
not a policy equilibrium, it was nearly so: given the configuration of policy 
preferences in the House and Senate, along with institutional vetoes, room to 
maneuver in negotiating tax policy had shrunk dramatically. There was per- 164  Charles H. Stewart I11 
haps room for reform that cut taxes a little more and restored a little progres- 
sivity to the tax code, but nothing as dramatic as the changes in 1981. Stale- 
mate in tax policy, which is half the stalemate in balancing the federal budget, 
is a product of the 1981 tax reform and the constitutional system of separated 
institutions sharing power. 
This summary of tax policy may seem to fly in the face of what appears to 
be volatility in tax policy after 1981, especially the events of  1985 and 1986. 
Yet  it is also reasonable to ascribe the constant tinkering with the revenue code 
after 1981 and the piecemeal lurching back toward higher revenues to the se- 
verity of  the constraints posed by the cataclysmic events of  1981. Nor  are 
events of 1985-86 entirely inconsistent with this analysis. The primary reason 
bargaining over reform took so long, even though it was Ronald Reagan’s key 
second-term domestic initiative, was that the outcome of  198 1 heightened the 
inherent partisan tensions surrounding tax policy. The final deal was a delicate 
compromise that allowed partisans of  each party to claim victory-Demo- 
crats for aiding the very lowest ends of the income scale and Republicans for 
moving the income tax close to a “flat tax.”30  Given the close partisan balance 
in Congress, had Ronald Reagan not made tax reform a crowning jewel of his 
second term, reform would have been impossible. Even so, the vetoes inher- 
ent in the separation of powers assured that neither party could credibly claim 
to have instituted their own party’s ideal tax system. 
Much of the course of tax reform in the 1980s can be understood beginning 
with  an appreciation of  the historic partisan division over tax policy-the 
changes in  1981 were clearly “Republican” reforms and the resulting efforts 
to deal with their budgetary effects (Le., deficits) were hampered by the divi- 
sion of  partisan control of the federal government for the entire decade. On 
the  margin,  institutional and  political developments help to  round  out  an 
understanding of tax reform during this decade. Palpable dissatisfaction with 
taxation that grew during the  1970s set the stage for dramatic alterations of 
the tax code following the repudiation of the Democratic party in the  1980 
election; the rise of  supply-side economics set the agenda for the particular 
type of  revisions that were initially considered; and the democratization of 
Congress during the two preceding decades made tax policy more responsive 
to outside pressures and left committee and party leaders in Congress scram- 
bling to adapt to this new institutional order. 
Given that this essay is about policy-making in a key economic arena, one 
may ask about the role of economic theory and advice in shaping the course 
of  events in the  1980s-such  a discussion has  been notably absent in  this 
essay. The reason economic theory and the advice of  economists has been 
minimized here is that there is little compelling evidence in the record of  the 
decade that these were powerful independent factors guiding the fate of  re- 
form. To the extent that new theory entered the debate, it was largely to bol- 
ster the positions held by  the two parties for over a century. In other words, 
the ascendance of  supply-side theory shifted the grounds of  debate, but  it 165  The Politics of Tax Reform 
hardly reoriented the worldview of  most Republican and Democratic politi- 
cians. As with innovation in other eras, neither party conspicuously embraced 
ideas orthogonal to their past. Thus, it is difficult to say that tax policy con- 
sciously followed any economic theory of taxation or that pronounced trends, 
such as those toward greater reliance on payroll taxes or the changing taxes on 
capital gains,  followed any logic other than short-term electoral necessity 
(broadly construed). 
Finally, this essay has focused considerable attention on Congress and little 
on President Reagan, even though he dominated the decade politically and 
seemed frequently to be the driving force in tax policy throughout. In part I 
have refrained from analyzing too closely Reagan’s personal impact on tax 
policy because political scientists are uncomfortable basing  general state- 
ments on the actions of individual presidents-the  “n  of one” problem. Aside 
from his fixation on the top marginal individual tax rate, I have focused here 
on what is most important about Ronald Reagan: he was a Republican. He 
brought Republican advisors into the executive branch, banished any overt 
mention of  tax increases from public discourse, and (credibly) threatened to 
veto any change to the tax code that noticeably increased the tax burden on 
his party’s constituents. That accomplished, the real political work shifted to 
Congress, which is charged by  the Constitution with laying and collecting 
taxes. 
Notes 
1.  The time period of comparison here consists of intervals of three fiscal years. 
“Tax deficit” is defined here as 
2 
d, = 2 W,-, -  Rt-3)/R,-3, 
where R, = real federal revenues in year t and R,-,is  the base year. In other words, this 
measure takes real revenues three years prior as the baseline and then aggregates the 
difference between the baseline revenues and actual revenues over the next three years. 
The measure is scaled by dividing each element in the sum by baseline revenues. 
2.  This is the point of the public-choice literature on legislatures. For useful over- 
views see Panning (1985) and Krehbiel(l988). 
3. In the following section I primarily rely on the publications of  Congressional 
Quarterly  (relevant editions of the  Weekly Report, Almanac,  and Congress and  the 
Nation)  to characterize the details of the tax reforms of the 1980s. For lucid discussions 
of the economics of the income tax and tax reform, see Surrey and McDaniel(1985), 
Bradford (1986), and Pechman (1987). Citations to other contemporary accounts and 
interpretations of these reforms are made in the text. 
4. Soon after the act was passed, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the 
following revenue increases due to TEFRA over its first three years: $18.0 billion in 
fiscal year (FY) 1983, $37.7 billion in FY 1984, and $42.7 billion in FY 1985 (U.S. 
Congress, Joint.Taxation Committee 1982,455). These predictions turn out to be close 
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to subsequent OMB estimates based on experience with the act’s provisions (see table 
5.3 below). 
5.  For analyses of the politics of the 1986 cut, see Bimbaum and Murray (1987), 
Strahan (1990), Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam (1990) and the symposium on the re- 
forms in the summer 1987 issue of the Journal of  Economic Perspectives. To Bimbaum 
and Murray, the tax reform is explained primarily in  terms of the hard work of two 
committee chairmen, Senator Mark Hatfield and Representative Dan Rostenkowski. 
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam emphasize the interactions of “ideas, experts, and entre- 
preneurs” in an age of “new politics” dominated by  policy constraints and the news 
media. Strahan attributes the change to institutional developments in the House Ways 
and Means Committee. 
6. This figure is calculated as follows. In FY  1988 total trust fund receipts were 
$473.7 billion and outlays were $375.9 billion, which resulted in a trust fund surplus 
of $97.8 billion. The overall federal deficit in FY  1988 was $155.1 billion. Had the 
$97.8 billion trust fund surplus not been collected (or had it been spent instead), the 
federal deficit would have been $252.9 billion.  Thus, the trust fund surplus reduced 
the deficit by 39% (=  97.81252.9). 
7.  It is this effect that led Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New  York) in late 
1989 to propose a significant reduction in payroll (FICA) taxes (Elving 1990). Moyni- 
hank sentiments echoed those expressed by the Democratic members of  the National 
Economic Commission, a blue-ribbon panel appointed with the charge to find a plan to 
balance the federal budget. (Moynihan was a member of the commission, which issued 
its report on 1 March 1990.) The minority report issued by the Democrats concluded: 
Let no one suppose that a Democratic Congress will much longer allow a payroll 
tax to be used to service a $2 to $3 trillion debt owned in vastly disproportionate 
amounts by wealthy individuals and institutions. It already required nearly one-half 
the revenues of the income tax to pay the interest. This surely is the largest transfer 
of  wealth from labor to capital in the history of our “political arithmetic.” But at 
least this is a graduated tax. . . . The nation struggled for a generation to ratify the 
XVth Amendment to the Constitution.  We  are not about [to] see it effectively re- 
pealed by a reform in the financing of  Social Security. (National Economic Com- 
mission 1989, 56-57) 
8.  About 10% of trust fund receipts are currently derived from interest payments on 
federal debt instruments. About one-seventh of the federal government’s annual inter- 
est payments are made to trust funds. 
9.  There is evidence that citizens nationally did not equate taxes,  spending,  and 
budget balancing too closely. Asked in 1980 about the tax effects of  a constitutional 
amendment requiring the federal government to balance its budget annually, 35% of 
respondents predicted  such a requirement would cause taxes to increase,  24% pre- 
dicted taxes would be unchanged, and 28% predicted it would result in a tax cut (Gal- 
10. The Gallup Poll has taken regular soundings on citizen attitudes concerning the 
proposed balanced-budget constitutional amendment and suggested remedies for bal- 
ancing the budget.  From  1976 onward, support for a proposed constitutional amend- 
ment to require an annually balanced budget has never been supported by fewer than 
63% of  all respondents or by 73% of respondents who expressed an opinion. When 
given a choice of remedies for balancing the federal budget, the most favored remedy 
has typically been spending cuts. In  1983, for instance, only 18% of respondents fa- 
vored using the income tax to help balance the budget; this had risen to only 22% in 
1986. (In  1982 there was large support for raising excise taxes on liquor and ciga- 
rettes-70%  favored vs. 23% opposed-but  the question was not asked in subsequent 
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polls.)  By increasingly larger margins during the decade the only remedy receiving 
majority support  for reducing  the deficit was cutting military  spending (see Gallup 
Poll, esp. 1976-89). 
11.  For instance, in an early 1988 poll, 64% of respondents reported being willing 
to support a tax increase if the proceeds would go toward improving education. This 
proportion varied little according to whether the respondent had children in public or 
private school, or whether the respondent had children in school at all (Gaflup  Poll 
1988, 16). 
12.  A bible of this movement was Gilder (1981); see Greider (1985),  Stockman 
(1987), and Roberts (1984) for insiders’ views of the supply-side revolution. 
13.  Whether this body of work merely represented a repackaging of traditional Re- 
publican “trickle-down” economics remains open to dispute. For insights to this ques- 
tion see Greider (1985), Stockman (1987) and Lekachman (1982). At the very least 
this body of literature was compelling enough that more mainstream economists felt a 
need to respond to it, and voters, many of whom still associated Republican economic 
policy with the Great Depression, became more receptive to Republican economics. 
14.  The definition of what constitutes a tax expenditure,  in addition to the whole 
issue of  whether tax expenditures exist at all, is controversial.  Table 5.5 is useful, 
however, in gaining insight into the order of magnitude by which changes have been 
made in the tax code to effect social ends. 
15.  For tax year 1980, 61% of returns filed were on form 1040. This rose to 67% 
for 1986 before falling back slightly to 66% in 1987, the first year changes from the 
1986 TRA were in effect (US. Internal Revenue Service, Fall  1989, 76). The 1986 
TRA appears not to have affected the percentage of returns prepared by a tax preparer 
(U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Spring 1989, 113). 
16.  For a unique  argument  in favor of complexity  in the tax  code  see Lindsey 
(1990). 
17.  For historical looks at the issue of taxation see Witte (1985), Hansen (1985), 
Taussig (1892), Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), Selko (1940), and Stanwood (1903). 
18. One must not go too far and ascribe Reagan’s election in 1980 to his views on 
tax policy, or any policy for that matter. Substantial research on public opinion during 
the 1980 election indicates that most of  the public was typically closer to Jimmy Carter 
on policy matters than to Reagan (Frankovic 1981). The election of Reagan itself can 
easily be ascribed to the poor economic performance of 1980, rather than by the pub- 
lic’s embrace of  Republican economic policies (Kiewiet and Rivers  1985; Ferejohn 
and Fiorina 1985). 
19.  Another, less-cited statistic suggests that Southern Democrats should have been 
less worried about Reagan’s electoral appeal: Reagan only out-polled 4 of 69 Southern 
Democrats in their districts. Thus, while Reagan carried 58% of the Southern Demo- 
cratic districts, 94% of the Democratic representatives still ran ahead of the president. 
20.  The first two votes were substitutes by  Congressmen Udall (D-Arizona)  and 
Conable (R-New  York). The last two were votes on final passage and on the confer- 
ence report, respectively. 
21.  On these votes there was an average of  157 Northern Democrats, 76 Southern 
Democrats, and 188 Republicans. Thus, assuming all the Republicans voted together, 
they needed only 23 Southern Democratic votes to win. 
22.  The standard history and analysis of the pre-reform Ways and Means Commit- 
tee is Manley (1970); also see Fenno (1973). For analysis of the post-reform era, see 
Rudder (1978,  1983, 1989) and Strahan (1990). Bach and Smith (1988) and Smith 
(1989) also contain more general accounts about how the institutional reforms of the 
1970s affected the relationship between the House floor and its committees. 
23.  The only significant diminishment  of  Ways  and Means’ jurisdiction  came in 168  Charles €I.  Stewart 111 
1865, when it lost authority over appropriations bills to a new Appropriations Commit- 
tee and lost jurisdiction over banking regulation to a newly created Banking and Cur- 
rency Committee (Stewart 1989). 
24.  For a sustained argument along these lines see Strahan (1990, chaps. 6,7). 
25.  The  repeal  of  the  Medicare  Catastrophic  Coverage  Act  suggests  that  well- 
organized groups still have tremendous influence in the tax policy apparatus, although 
the persistent resistance by the leadership to efforts to cut capital gains taxes suggests 
just the opposite-that  leaders can resist popular tax cuts when they so desire. 
26.  A11  that is really required is that the utility functions of each actor be symmetric 
around her ideal point. Because these models are mostly illustrative, in this section I 
assume that all utility functions are represented by “simple Euclidean preferences.” On 
spatial voting models and representations of utility see Enelow and Hinich (1984) and 
Ordeshook (1986). For purposes of the examples I also assume the utility functions of 
all members of each chamber are identical. 
27.  In the example, the Senate median is unable to bargain for a bill closer to it (B, 
= B,  + E, E +  0) because the House median prefers Q to any B,.  Note that, given the 
configuration of  preferences  and the location of  the status quo, granting the Senate 
median the right to move first would yield tax policy located at B, = S, while granting 
the president the right to move first would produce B, = P. On such “structure-induced 
equilibrium” models see Krehbiel(l988). 
28.  I am of course ignoring problems of social choice instability within each insti- 
tution for the sake of clarity in the example. 
29.  A closed rule would allow no amendments and force an up-or-down vote on the 
floor. 
30.  Republicans were notably silent about the 1986 repeal of the capital gains ex- 
clusion, a special provision of the tax law that seems key to their concerns about stim- 
ulating investment.  Subsequent attempts to reinstate the special treatment of capital 
gains suggests why this is so: revenue gained from the capital gains repeal provided the 
revenues necessary to lower the top marginal rates and to scale back preferences more 
favored by  Democrats  (e.g.,  IRAs) (Shanahan  1986a, 1986b; Rapp  1986). Thus a 
reinstitution of the capital gains exemption, which might be defensible on economic 
grounds, would be disastrous for revenues because of the revenue lost directly through 
the reinstatement and the revenues lost by  the exclusions that Democrats would de- 
mand in return. 
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Comment  David F.  Bradford 
As the author confirms by his summary of the history, the 1980s constituted a 
period of  very considerable movement in tax policy.  In particular, the 1980s 
saw two major pieces of income tax legislation, the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act (ERTA) of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of  1986. ERTA cut indi- 
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Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and a research associate of  the National Bureau 
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vidual  and  corporate rates,  made  “permanent” the  investment tax  credit, 
greatly accelerated depreciation, increased the capital gains exclusion, and 
gave up a lot of revenue. It also, very significantly, introduced indexing of tax 
brackets and exemptions, thereby profoundly altering the reversion point of 
income tax policy. The TRA radically reversed the treatment of  investment, 
radically cut corporate and individual marginal tax rates, and radically shifted 
the revenue mix toward corporations and away from individuals. In addition 
to these major income tax changes, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 
cut benefits and sharply increased payroll tax rates. 
Stewart’s focus is on the income tax changes. The logic of his approach is 
that of time-series analysis, although not of the formal statistical variety, with 
income tax policy as the dependent variable. A time-series model has two 
elements: (a)  a times series of dependent and exogenous variables and (b) a 
hypothesis about the relationship between the two groups of variables, includ- 
ing a specification of any time shift in that relationship. 
In a loose sense, the objective of Stewart’s paper is to “explain” the experi- 
ence of the 1980s. Strictly speaking, we cannot ask more of empirical analysis 
than to reject hypotheses. In this complex setting there are inevitably many 
hypotheses that are not rejected by  the record.  What we presumably must 
settle for are hypotheses that are somehow inherently plausible. We  would 
also like hypotheses that are truly informative in the sense that, knowing the 
hypotheses about the shift in time structure of the relationship and knowing 
the path of the exogenous variables, we could go a long way toward predicting 
the path of the endogenous variables (tax policy, in the present case). 
I think it is fair to describe the exogenous variables in Stewart’s model as 
the party dominance of the houses of Congress and the presidency. During the 
Carter years, 1977-80,  Democrats controlled all three. In the 1980 elections, 
Reagan captured the White House, the Republicans took over the Senate, and 
Republicans gained in the House. Although the Senate remained under Re- 
publican control through the elections of  1986, the threat to Democratic con- 
trol of  the House evaporated in the elections of  1982. In Stewart’s analysis, 
the influence of  these exogenous political events on policy took place in  a 
system experiencing a time shift in the relationship between exogenous and 
endogenous variables consisting of  the playing out of  new “porosity” of  the 
House Ways and Means Committee from 1980 onward. 
The endogenous variable, income tax policy, is characterized along two 
dimensions: the amount of revenue raised and the degree of progressivity (re- 
latedly, the “pro-” or “anti-” business nature of the rules). 
Here is how I understand Stewart’s time-series analysis: (1) In  1981, the 
Reagan landslide plus new porosity imply a radical policy shift toward the 
Republican position (ERTA of  1981). (2) In 1982, Democratic resurgence in 
the House implies the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 
1982, a reversion toward the Democratic position within the ERTA  frame- 
work. (3) In 1986, a stalemate in political power implies revenue and distri- 172  Charles H. Stewart I11 
butional neutrality of the TRA of  1986, but the new porosity permits the con- 
siderable innovation in the details of policy. (4) After 1986, the Democratic 
recovery of  the Senate is insufficient to break the stalemate, so no further 
innovation in tax policy takes place. 
Although I find this description of the politics of income tax policy stimu- 
lating, I find the model unconvincing in  two respects. First, I question the 
stability of  party preferences as Stewart describes them. I would say that, in 
the crucial dimension of revenue, the Reagan policy preference represented a 
sharp break from the traditional Republican position. If  that is the case, the 
Republican dominance after 1980 cannot explain the policy development; one 
must distinguish Reagan Republicanism from traditional Republican view- 
points. (And perhaps one must explain the emergence of the former?) There 
was also change over time in the Democratic policy position. Second, I do not 
feel that the dimensions of  policy identified by  Stewart-revenues  and pro- 
gressivity-capture  the distinguishing features of what to me is the most re- 
markable break  with  the past  in  the  story,  the  astounding-to-all-observers 
transformation of  the structure of  the income tax embodied in the TRA of 
1986. It seems to me hard to explain the tax policies of  the  1980s without 
adding (and preferably explaining) Ronald Reagan as a political phenomenon. 
From the perspective of the structural character of the income tax, I would 
describe the time series of the dependent variable somewhat differently. When 
I was at the U.S. Treasury during the Ford administration, a Democratically 
controlled Congress was  holding the fort  against Republican  policies that 
were oriented toward encouraging business investment and balancing the bud- 
get at lowered levels of spending. (Treasury Secretary William Simon vigor- 
ously promoted procapital formation policies .) The apparently most probusi- 
ness policies under discussion, advocated by Congressman Jack Kemp, were 
not yet Republican orthodoxy. In 1976, Jimmy Carter was elected president; 
among his more prominent platform planks was a commitment to clean up an 
income tax system he described as “a disgrace to the human race.” The Carter 
team at Treasury, headed by Lawrence Woodworth, longtime chief of staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, put together a comprehensive reform pack- 
age with many resemblances to the TRA of 1986 (although not with such low 
rates). In view of  the experience of the end of  the Ford administration, the 
Carter election victory, the familiarity with Congress on the part of the Trea- 
sury, and the overwhelming Democratic control of  policy,  one would have 
expected easy passage of what, up until that time, appeared to be the “Demo- 
cratic” policy position: comprehensive income taxation (lower rates but rela- 
tively heavy taxation of capital). 
Carter was effectively defied by  the Democratic Congress, which instead 
put in place a policy that incorporated a variety of procapital formation fea- 
tures (saving incentives, extension of the investment tax credit, some acceler- 
ated depreciation, and enhancement of  the capital gains exclusion). At  the 
time I perceived in these developments a continuation of  a long-term trend 173  The Politics of Tax Reform 
away from taxation based upon accretion income and toward one based effec- 
tively on consumption (a policy dimension not taken into account in Stewart’s 
analysis). On the evidence of  1978, that trend was an expression of bipartisan 
preference. 
From that perspective, the ERTA  of  1981 represented a continuation of, 
rather than break with, the trend to that point in the structure of the income 
tax. The major change was a new indifference to large fiscal deficits, an out- 
come that reflected not the victory of traditional Republican policy preference 
but a remarkable shift in that preference from a traditional stance in favor of 
fiscal soundness. In  its revenue dimension, the ERTA  incorporated a tradi- 
tional Democratic willingness to use the tax system to direct investment with 
the rather untraditional Reagan-Republican interest in cutting current tax rev- 
enues (government debt constituted discounted future tax revenue) indepen- 
dently of cuts in current spending. 
Stewart’s model seems to me to give no basis for predicting the structural, 
rather than the revenue, aspects of the TRA of  1986. My explanation has two 
pieces. The first is the Reagan-Republican focus on low marginal tax rates (to 
a significant degree independent of  the base to which the marginal rates ap- 
plied) and the second is the widespread conviction that an accretion income 
tax is “right.” The former led the Reagan administration to put its weight be- 
hind  the  incipient base-broadening forces in  Congress (Bradley-Gephardt, 
Kemp-Roth, etc.), and the latter led the professional staff at Treasury to pro- 
pose a Haig-Simons income structure (rather than a cash-flow income struc- 
ture, as might have been implemented in a continuation of  the policy trend 
noted  above). Under the circumstances, component-by-component revenue 
neutrality would have implied a much lower corporate income tax rate than 
the top individual income tax rate, an outcome regarded as politically unten- 
able (not to mention probably unsustainable in implementation). So a corol- 
lary of the Reagan approach was not only a 180 degree turn with respect to 
the taxation of the return to investment, but also the rejuvenation of  the cor- 
poration income tax as a source of revenue. 
In view of the number of oxen being gored, it was by no means assured that 
the resulting policy would find acceptance on the Hill, but, in retrospect, it at 
least makes a certain amount of sense that the Democratic political forces in 
the House were willing to give their assent to a version of  the Reagan pro- 
posal. The biggest surprise was the Senate, where, after a false start, Pack- 
wood’s Finance Committee produced the low-rate formula that ultimately car- 
ried the day. This Page Intentionally Left Blank